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This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael 
Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent 
their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. 
In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of 
justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well 
as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 
'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are 
two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil 
of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals 
are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The 
ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as 
how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are 
deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting 
society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who 
or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are 
going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality 
traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. 
In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial 
part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims 
that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that 
they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to 
be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, 
that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of 
enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused 
problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she 
considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers 
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to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what 
is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to 
this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of 
communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of 
Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests 
on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre 
because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls 
views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that 
Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence 
of community and values in the make up of individuals. 
In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to 
Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the 
person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical 
view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it 
an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard 
Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the 
person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of 
the metaphysics of the self. 
In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the 
communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is 
committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a 
political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception 
that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic 
social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his 
theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs 
from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own 




In this chapter I will outline John Rawls's theory of justice. I will concentrate on the 
themes that communitarians find objectionable in as far as the concept of the person is 
concerned. My outline will be limited to what is read by communitarians as committing 
Rawls to a certain conception of the self. 
1.2 Justice and social Institutions 
Rawls views justice as crucially important to all social institutions. Any institution that is 
not just should be abolished no matter how efficient or well organised it is. Each and 
every person has inviolable rights that are based on justice. These rights cannot be 
violated for the sake of the benefit of other members of the society. He says, "in a just 
society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice 
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest" (Rawls, 
1971:4). This means that the needs of the group can never be taken as worthy of 
sacrificing the dignity or rights of any single member of the society. 
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An injustice, for Rawls, can only be allowed if it will prevent an even greater injustice 
from happening. If that is not the case then any social institution that exhibits injustice 
should be abolished or revised. Rawls's intention is to work out a theory of justice from 
which the primacy of justice can be asserted. 
His starting point is the assumption that society is a self-sufficient association of persons, 
who in their relations recognise certain rules as binding and tend to observe these rules in 
most cases. These rules work to specify a system of cooperation between participants. 
Although society is a cooperative venture a conflict of interest will always arise. 
However, on the other hand, an identity of interest also arises because it makes life better 
for all than if all were to live in isolation. A conflict of interest arises mainly because 
people are not indifferent to the way the fruits of their cooperation are distributed. Each 
individual would want to have a far bigger share compared to a smaller share to enable 
her to pursue her interests. In order to regulate this state of affairs Rawls suggests that 
there should be principles that will be considered fair by all the participants in society. 
A set of principles is required for choosing among the various 
social arrangements which determine this division of advantages 
and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive 
shares. These principles are the principles of social justice: 
they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic 
institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution 
of the benefits and burdens of society (Rawls, 1971:4) 
A society is well ordered when it is not only designed to advance the interests of its 
members but when it is also governed by a public conception of justice that is accepted 
by everyone and is satisfied by all social institutions. Although individuals might have 
different aims, they will share a commonly held conception of public justice. Rawls 
further argues that although people might have different conceptions of what justice is, 
they will agree that social institutions are just when they do not use arbitrary methods to 
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discriminate against persons in assigning rights and duties as well as in adjudicating 
between competing claims to social advantages. 
1.3 The nature of justice 
Rawls notes that many things can be called just or unjust. For example persons can be 
called unjust, or actions by persons can be called unjust. But Rawls's primary concern is 
what he calls social justice. Social justice is mainly concerned with the way in which 
social institutions assign rights and duties and how they determine the distribution of 
social advantages from what he calls social cooperation (Rawls, 1971:7). His 
understanding of major institutions includes the political framework, the economic and 
social structure. These major institutions play a crucial role in determining the rights and 
duties as well as benefits of the citizens. 
Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men's rights 
and duties and influence their life-prospects, what they can expect to be 
and how well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary subject 
of justice because its effects are so profound from the start (Rawls, 1971:7). 
A fact of life is that people are born into different positions. These different positions 
create different expectations. Different expectations are created by the political, economic 
and social circumstances that each individual is born into. Institutions favour the starting 
positions of some members of society compared to others. It is here that the principles of 
social justice must apply in order to deal with these inequalities. Rawls says that these 
principles of social justice only apply well to major social institutions. They may not 
apply as well to families or associations or clubs or serve as an ideal of friendship. It is 
important to note that Rawls is not an advocate of some form of egalitarian society. He 
simply argues that any form of inequality must be adjudicated by principles of justice. 
1.4 The idea behind this theory of justice 
Rawls envisages those who enter into social cooperation as deciding once and for all 
principles that will assign basic rights and duties and social benefits. These decisions will 
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include how people will regulate their claims against each other. Just as a person will 
rationally decide what the good is for her, society will also in the same way decide what 
counts as just and unjust. This decision that individuals come to will be made in an initial 
situation which he calls the original position. The original position is somewhat similar to 
the state of nature in traditional theories of the social contract. 
The guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of 
society are the objects of the original agreement. They are the principles 
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would 
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of 
their association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they 
specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms 
of government that can be established. This way of regarding the principles 
of justice I shall call justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971:11). 
1.5 The original position 
The original position is not to be thought as an actual historical position or event. It does 
not even represent a state of affairs that could have prevailed in a primitive culture. It is a 
hypothetical position that is supposed to lead to a certain conception of justice. The 
people in the original position must arrive at a certain conception of justice. It will lead to 
that particular conception of justice because of the circumstances that the subjects in that 
position are in. In the original position, parties are deprived of certain information about 
themselves. The information that the parties in the original position are deprived of 
includes the knowledge of their place in society. This means that the parties do not know 
who or what they are going to be in society. The parties do not know what position or 
class they are going to occupy. They do not know if they are going to be rich or poor, 
rulers or subjects. 
The parties do not know what their fortunes are going to be with regard to the distribution 
of natural assets or liabilities. This means that individuals do not know if they are going 
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to be talented in a certain way or if they are going to be totally untalented and physically 
disabled. They do not know how much energy and amount of entrepreneurship they are 
going to muster. They do not know if they are going to make extraordinary contributions 
to their society or not. They do not know if they are going to be treasured as people of 
talent or they are going to be regarded as an expense to their society. 
The individuals do not know what their intelligence is going to be. They do not know if 
they are going to be extraordinarily intelligent or if they are going to be dull. They are 
also not aware if they are going to have any strength or they are going to be weaklings 
who will not be able to defend themselves or their interests when they are under threat 
from those who have the strength. 
The individuals in the original position are also not aware of what their conception of the 
good is going to be. This means that the subjects are not aware of what they will consider 
to be valuable and what they will consider to be unworthy. Conceptions of the good differ 
from individual to individual. A person who finds value in thinking about the nature of 
human life and the universe is different from someone who finds value in drinking large 
amounts of alcohol. A person who finds value in dedicating her life to helping others is 
different from someone who finds value in amassing a lot of money for herself. A 
conception of the good gives a person ends to pursue, that conception also shapes the way 
a person leads her life. A person who believes in helping others or sacrificing herself for 
the freedom of others will have different values from a person who believes in dancing 
perfectly. 
The people in Rawls's original position do not know how they should lead their lives. 
They do not know how they should lead their lives because they are not aware of what 
they are going to hold as valuable. This leads the people in the original position to refrain 
from discriminating against certain conceptions of the good. This lack of knowledge of 
the conception of the good is meant to ensure that no particular conception will be treated 
favourably and no conception will be discriminated against. 
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With this lack of knowledge about certain aspects of their situation, the subjects in the 
original position then enter into a bargain as to how their society should be organised. 
They bargain behind what Rawls calls a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance refers to 
the information mentioned above that subjects are not aware of. The idea being captured 
is that when agreeing to conceptions of justice certain information should not be included 
in that bargaining process. These individuals will come to an agreement that is fair 
without the influence of contingencies that might make them advocate one form of social 
arrangement over the other where justice is concerned. 
Their lack knowledge about their class, gender, intelligence and strength also ensures 
fairness in deciding the principles that will govern how claims against individuals will be 
regulated. It also ensures that the individuals will arrive at a conception that does not 
favour certain classes over the others in the distribution of social advantages. 
Behind the veil of ignorance no-one will be advantaged or disadvantaged in arriving at 
the principles of justice because everyone is equal. 
For given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of 
everyone's relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between 
individuals as moral persons, that is as rational beings with their own 
ends and capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice. The original 
position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus 
fundamental agreements reached in it are fair (Rawls, 1971:12). 
Justice as fairness means that the principles of justice that are agreed to in the original 
position are fair. The individuals have come to them on grounds that are equal and fair. 
No one is favoured over and above the other and no one is discriminated against. 
One way of seeing justice as fairness is to think of the individuals in the original position 
as rational and mutually disinterested. This should not be interpreted as meaning that 
these individuals are egoists who are only interested in certain things like prestige or 
9 
power. What it simply means is that each individual does not take an interest in another's 
interest. It is possible that the interests of these individuals may be opposed, but they 
must come up with principles that will govern them fairly. 
The next point then is to discover what kind of principles these individuals will choose. 
Rawls argues that these individuals will not in all likelihood choose principles that are in 
accord with utilitarianism. 
Will Kymlicka neatly explains why Rawls thinks people in the original position will not 
choose utilitarianism. 
Not all political theories show the same concern with the equitableness 
of the distribution of the good. Utilitarianism is prepared to contemplate 
endlessly sacrificing one person's good in order to maximize the 
overall good. But other theories put constraints on the sacrifices that 
can be asked of one person in order to promote the good of others-
even if the effect of these constraints is to prevent maximization of the 
overall good. Political theories which take rights seriously 
will disallow trade-offs which deny some individuals their basic 
human needs or rights, even if those trade offs would maximize the 
good overall (Kymlicka, 1989:22). 
Priority is given to the right over the good and in this sense Rawls's theory is called 
deontological. In the original position each individual seeks to protect her own interests 
and desires. It is not possible that any individual will choose principles that will compel 
others to lead lives that are less fulfilling for the sake of the greatest number. The 
individuals in the original position will choose two principles that are quite different. The 
first principle that they will choose will ask for equality in assigning basic rights and 
duties. The second principle will hold that social and economic inequalities are justified 
only if they are to the benefit of everyone, particularly the disadvantaged. Rawls states 
these two principles as follows: 
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First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions open to all (Rawls, 1971:60). 
But there is a question of justification that Rawls needs to address. This question seeks an 
answer as to why people in the original position would arrive at these two principles of 
justice as opposed to any other principles. Rawls says that conceptions of justice are 
arrived at because the circumstances of those who are deliberating make these principles 
acceptable. For the people in the original position it would be rational to arrive at these 
principles. 
What needs to be guaranteed in the original position is that no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged by natural circumstances in deciding the principles of justice. No one 
should be allowed to fit the principles of justice to her particular station in life. Also it 
must be ensured "that particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons' conceptions of 
their good do not affect the principles adopted" (Rawls, 1971:18). 
Knowledge of contingencies that bring people into conflict is ruled out because they will 
lead people into advocating certain principles that might not be fair. Rawls also rules out 
prejudices that might make people support a certain conception of the good over others. 
If all these contingencies are ruled out we can see how we arrive at the veil of ignorance 
naturally. 
Mulhall and Swift make the importance of the veil of ignorance explicit: 
The intuition being captured here is that which links fairness to ignorance 
If I don't know which of the five pieces of cake that I am cutting I am going 
to end up with, then it makes sense for me to cut the pieces fairly. Similarly, 
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if people don't know who they are going to be, then it will make sense for 
them to choose fair or just principles to regulate their society (1997:3). 
1.6 Division of the two principles 
The two principles of justice apply to the basic structure of society. They govern how 
rights and duties are assigned among citizens and they also regulate the distribution of the 
fruits of social cooperation between individuals. 
These principles show that the social structure can be divided into two parts. The first 
part deals with securing the rights of the citizens. It is the principle that establishes that 
each member of the society has inviolable rights and that all citizens are equal. It is the 
principle that rules out any attempt to compromise the rights of any citizens for the sake 
of the majority. This principle also rules out any attempt to compromise the rights of 
citizens so that their material welfare can be greatly improved. The first principle secures 
the rights of citizens that include their right to vote, the right to belong to any political 
party, freedom of conscience and freedom of association. 
The second principle deals with how social and economic inequalities are governed. This 
principle does not say that any form of inequality is not allowed at all. What it says is if 
there is going to be inequality it should be to the advantage of everyone especially the 
disadvantaged. A social structure will be seen as equal if all its positions are open to all 
its citizens. No citizen should be barred from occupying any position because of their 
background, but positions must be filled according to merit. Injustice occurs when 
inequality is not to the benefit of all the members of society. 
In its most basic form this is what the theory of justice entails as I have outlined above. 
However, communitarians find Rawls's theory objectionable. The objection that I will be 
looking at is that Rawls is committed to a certain conception of the self. This objection is 




2.1 The Communitarian objection 
There are several objections made by different communitarians to John Rawls. In this 
chapter I will discuss the objections made by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre 
with regard to what they conceive to be Rawls's theory of the person. 
2.2 Sandel's metaphysical objection 
Sandel sees Rawls's conception of the self as essentially a claim about what is most 
worthy in the treatment of human beings. He suggests that, on Rawls's account, there are 
two senses in which an agent of choice is prior to its ends. The first is a moral imperative 
that requires that the individual's autonomy be respected beyond the ends that she might 
pursue. The second is that the self is prior to the ends she chooses. Her identity is fixed 
prior to these ends and they do not constitute it. 
Sandel says "...justice as fairness... conceives the unity of the self as something 
antecedently established, fashioned prior to the choices it makes in the course of its 
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experience" (Sandel, 1982:21). The relationship between the self and its ends as 
suggested by Rawls commits him to a certain metaphysical view of the self. That 
relationship says something fundamental about the nature of human beings and their 
identity. Rawls's view of the person as an autonomous chooser of ends constrains him to 
give moral priority to the subject over her ends. What is most worthy is that capacity to 
choose as opposed to what the subject chooses. This capacity to choose comes before the 
individual does the choosing. Therefore, the moral worth of the subject is prior to the 
ends that are chosen. 
This moral priority is explained by Rawls's assignment of a metaphysical priority. The 
essential unity and priority of the self is given prior to the ends it chooses. Here, Sandel 
sees an absoluteness of the metaphysical priority accounting for the moral priority. In 
essence we are beings who have the capacity to choose and revise our ends. That is our 
metaphysical make-up. And with our morality the exercise of that capacity is what is 
worthy of respect over what is chosen. Sandel sees Rawls as committed to this 
metaphysical account of the self because of the way that Rawls pictures the relationship 
between the self and its ends. Rawls sees the self as prior to its ends. The subject's ends 
are hers because she chooses them, this means that there should be a self in the first place 
to do the choosing and then the ends become hers. 
The Rawlsian self is not constituted or conditioned by the ends it chooses. She has a 
strange relationship with her ends. They are hers but not her. They do not constitute her 
in any sense. She relates to them because she has chosen to relate to them. Her identity 
has already been established before she has come to choose her ends. "The antecedent 
unity of the self means that the subject, however heavily conditioned by his surroundings, 
is always, irreducibly, prior to his values and ends and never fully constituted by them" 
(Sandel, 1982:22). This means that the self can never be conditioned by her surroundings 
and a self s situation can never be a constitutive part of her. 
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2.3 The moral subject 
Sandel seeks to understand the subject that is in Rawls's original position. He wants to 
see what really constitutes that subject and what claims can be made about it. He writes 
that for Rawls: 
...we are beings capable of justice, and more precisely, beings for whom 
justice is primary, we must be creatures of a certain kind, related to 
human circumstances in a certain way. What then must be true of a subject 
for whom justice is the first virtue? And how is the conception of such a 
subject embodied in the original position? (Sandel, 1982:49). 
Sandel sees Rawls's subject as non-contingent. It will not be affected by its situation and 
it will not relate to its ends in any fundamental or meaningful way. The subject's 
constitution will be prior to its experience. This picture, painted in the original position, 
can be described as a conception of the person or a theory of human nature. Sandel 
acknowledges that this term may mean different things but what he has in mind is a 
philosophical anthropology that concerns the nature of human beings in their various 
forms of identity. 
He argues that the mutual disinterest that Rawls talks about in the original position is not 
only a motivational assumption but also an assumption of human nature. 
The assumption of mutual disinterest is not an assumption about what 
motivates people, but an assumption about the nature of subjects who 
possess motivations in general. It concerns the nature of the self (that is, 
how it is constituted, how its stands with respect to its situation 
generally), not the nature of the self s desires or aims. It concerns the 
subject of interests and ends, not the content of those interests and 
ends, whatever they may happen to be (Sandel, 1982:54). 
From this we have to arrive at the conception of a subject that Rawls has in mind and that 
conception of the self, according to Sandel, can only be: 
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...an antecedently individuated subject, the bounds of whose self are 
fixed prior to experience. To be a deontological self, I must be a subject 
whose identity is given independently of the things I have, independently, 
that is, of my interests and ends and my relations with others (Sandel, 1982:55). 
For Sandel, to say a person possesses something means that she is merely related to it. 
She stands at a distance from it and this possession has two meanings. It means that the 
ends she has are hers as distinguished from being someone else's. But they are also hers 
in the sense that they belong to her rather than being her. If it happens that she loses those 
ends she still remains the same. She can just replace her ends as she wishes without 
losing herself in the process. This distancing of the self from her ends is essential to keep 
the identity of the self intact. In the face of all possible contingencies her identity remains 
unaffected and this is what Rawls is committed to. 
Sandel argues that this is a false way of seeing the self. If a desire grew within a person 
and the attachment to that desire also grew to great proportions, like an obsession, then 
that attachment ceases to be merely an attachment. That attachment will become the 
subject's identity. It will be her identity because it will be the overriding consideration in 
all that she does. Sandel says that attachment will possess the subject. Sandel's point is 
quite clear; the subject who identifies with a certain attachment very strongly will always 
refer to it before she does anything. That attachment determines the way she responds to 
different situations. If she departs from that attachment she ceases to be the subject she 
was. This is how he understands that subject in contrast to Rawls's subject: 
For the self whose identity is constituted in the light of ends already 
before it, agency consists less in summoning the will than in seeking 
self-understanding. The relevant question is not what ends to choose, 
for my problem is precisely that the answer to this question is already 
given, but rather who I am, how I am to discern in this clutter of 
possible ends what is me from what is mine. Here, the bounds of the 
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self are not fixtures but possibilities, their contours no longer self-evident 
but at least partly unformed. Rendering them clear, and defining the bounds 
of my identity are one and the same (Sandel, 1982:59). 
The identity of the subject, for Sandel, is conditioned by the contingencies that affect that 
subject. Whatever the subject does or whatever it encounters gives and forms that 
identity. The identity is not given prior to these contingencies and fixed as Rawls has 
made it appear. Rather it is an identity that is not fully formed but will have to be sorted 
and grasped in the midst of all the contingencies that the self encounters. His charge 
against Rawls, then, is that he has fixed the subject's identity prior to its ends. That 
subject is not affected by the contingencies it encounters and what is worthy is its ability 
to choose its ends. 
Sandel says that one result of "this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of 
experience, to make it invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all" (Sandel, 1982:62). 
This means that the self is not committed to anything that touches it deeply. Even if the 
self were to abandon that commitment it would remain unaltered. That self would 
continue as if nothing would have happened to it. Any change in the life purposes of that 
self would not disrupt its identity. No matter how big these changes are, the self would 
remain the same since it is bound and fixed prior to those changes. The self can turn away 
from any project without necessarily calling into question the person she is. A project that 
would have been thought to be part of her identity could be dismissed without anything 
happening to her identity. This independence enables Rawls's self to distance itself from 
its own moral values. 
The independent self rules out the possibility of any conception of the good, or bad, in 
constituting its identity. This means that the self can never be understood as constituted 
by what it holds to be valuable since it stands at a distance from what is valuable. The 
importance of attachments is restricted to value or sentiments. These attachments are not 
allowed to go beyond sentiment to touch on the identity of the self. The independent self 
rules out what Sandel calls an intersubjective description of the self. This is a description 
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of the self that is more than the individual's description of herself; it embraces other 
people like the individual's family, friends, community or nation. He also says the 
independent self rules out an intrasubjective conception. This refers to the possibility of 
the self being torn between several identities. 
These are the implications that Rawls is committed to in mapping out his original 
position. In Sandel's eyes mutual disinterest and cooperation for the sake of realising 
different ends make it impossible for the subjects to pursue communally oriented goals. 
They are also understood in a restricting way since their communities can never be 
constitutive of their identity. Those who value community cannot pursue what they value. 
Their communities are not part of them. They are places where disinterested individuals 
meet to further different and conflicting aims. 
2.4 Maclntyre and liberalism 
Maclntyre accuses liberalism, in general, of a commitment to a view of the self that is 
incoherent and one that prevents the possibility of the person being rational and objective 
in moral matters. This criticism and other criticisms of liberalism can apply to Rawls's 
project. Like Sandel, Maclntyre charges liberalism with failing to give due recognition 
and importance to communal life in shaping the identity and integrity of the person. 
Maclntyre starts his project by noting that individuals in modern society do not agree 
with each other on central moral questions. Each individual may have cogent arguments 
to support her own position and there is no possibility that they can ever come to any 
agreement on what is the morally acceptable thing to do. He gives an example of two 
individuals arguing about whether abortion is morally acceptable or not. The anti-
abortionist has sound premises and a good conclusion to support her argument. Her 
adversary also has sound premises and a good conclusion. He enquires why moderns can 
never come to an agreement on what is the moral thing to do. 
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2.5 Emotivism at fault 
Maclntyre argues that the problem facing the moderns is a consequence of emotivism. As 
a modern liberal, Rawls's position is seen as having been influenced by emotivism. 
Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically 
all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressive of 
attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. 
Particular judgments may of course unite moral and factual elements 
(Maclntyre, 1981:11). 
What this means is that there are no moral facts to which people can agree. In every 
moral statement what the individual is expressing is nothing more than her taste or 
preference. This is why moderns can never ever come to any agreement. Although it is 
possible for certain judgments to unite moral and factual elements, these two are 
normally distinguished. For moderns, the moral element has to be sharply distinguished 
from the factual element. 
Factual judgments may be true or false. There is a rational criterion that is followed to 
establish if a factual judgment is true or false. On the other hand moral judgments are 
merely expressions of attitudes and feelings hence there is no criterion in place to which 
we can refer to establish if they are true or false. For this reason, it is not possible to 
secure any agreement on moral matters. People will have differences because they have 
different feelings on moral issues. In all moral arguments proponents of a certain moral 
position want their listeners or adversaries to come to the way they feel through 
producing certain effects on their emotions. There is no rational discussion, what simply 
exists are the effects that conversation will have on emotions. 
Maclntyre sees the emotivist self as incapable of being identified with any moral attitude 
or point of view. This self simply plays certain roles. It has the capability to stand apart 
from those roles and criticise everything without touching on the core of its make-up. It 
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has no regard for its social relations and these relations do not impinge on who or what 
the self is. It is aloof in its relations with others and itself. 
The specifically modern self, the self that I have called emotivist, finds no 
limits set to that on which it may pass judgment for such limits could only 
derive from rational criteria for evaluation and, as we have seen, the 
emotivist self lacks any such criteria. Everything may be criticised from 
whatever standpoint the self has adopted, including the self s choice of 
standpoint to adopt (Maclntyre, 1981:30). 
This means that the self is not conditioned by any contingencies that it may encounter in 
the course of its life. Its identity is not formed by those contingencies, but rather it has an 
ability to criticise everything it encounters in its life. Maclntyre says some philosophers 
have seen the need to describe moral agency as an ability to stand back in every situation 
and pass judgment in a universalistic and detached manner. These philosophers see moral 
agency as located in the self as opposed to being located in the social roles that the self 
has. This clearly applies to Rawls's conception of the person. The worth of the self is not 
to be found in the ends that it chooses. On the contrary that worth is established in what is 
thought to be the inherent worth of the person, and that is located in the self. Simply this 
is its capacity to make choices. 
Maclntyre charges that the emotivist self has no rational history in moving from one 
moral commitment to another. The self criticises everything and makes all its judgments 
in an arbitrary way. Its commitments are arbitrary and temporary; if it decides to change 
them it does not lose or gain anything. Its transitions do not make any sense and they do 
not affect its identity. If, in the process of that transition, the self goes through any inner 
conflict, that conflict will be treated as an arbitrary confrontation of contingencies. 
Out of this arbitrary treatment of contingencies, the self is not capable of giving a 
coherent narrative to its life. The unity of the human life vanishes when a distinction is 
made between the individual and the roles she plays. Maclntyre says the individual's life 
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is seen as a series of unconnected events. These events are isolated and they do not make 
a single life story that can be coherently given as a unitary narrative of a single life. Each 
event that the self goes through is not connected to any other event. The self always finds 
itself living for a specific single moment. That moment is not related to any other 
moment that the self goes through. 
This means that the self can never develop any disposition that will mark its character 
out. In other words the self can never be called virtuous in the Aristotelian sense. Virtue 
only applies when a life is unitary. That life must be seen and evaluated as a whole as 
opposed to being seen in fragments. The modern self is not capable of giving that unitary 
narrative from birth to death. Instead it gives its account in a fragmented way. It is only 
capable of accounting for what it is experiencing at one particular moment and it fails to 
link that to its life as a whole. 
For Maclntyre thinking of a life as a whole that is given in a narrative mode is natural. He 
says that we should just turn to our unacknowledged assumptions in order to see how 
natural this is. If we see a person doing a certain activity we do not just judge that activity 
on its own. We try to understand what the motivations behind that activity are. He says 
we have to understand what the settings of that activity are. Every form of behaviour at 
any given time becomes an episode in the life of the actor. For Maclntyre intentions 
cannot be characterised independently of the settings. If intentions are characterised 
independently from the settings, then they do not make any sense to the self and to others. 
Maclntyre argues that in order to correctly characterise what a person is doing we need to 
know what her beliefs are. If we do not know what the individual's beliefs are then we 
will never know how to characterise her behaviour in reference to her settings. If those 
beliefs are not properly characterised, then a discussion on the individual's actions will 
not yield much. It is not possible to talk of behaviour that is identified prior to and 
independent of the settings and beliefs of the individual. An agent's action must be 
understood within a certain historical setting. An agent's action must be understood as 
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either furthering her major goal or undermining that major goal. An action is intelligible 
if it is furthering the agent's long term goals. 
An event counts as an action if it is in accord with the individual's motives and 
intentions. An action is something for which an individual is accountable. An individual 
can give an intelligible account for her actions and narrate her story as a unitary whole 
that is moving towards a certain purpose. The history of the individual and the history of 
her settings are very important in giving sense to what the individual is doing. Actions are 
historical in their nature, they are not unrelated occurrences that happen at any given 
time. 
For Maclntyre, the modern self suffers a serious deprivation. It has been robbed of its 
essential qualities. It is incapable of giving a historical account of its life. It also lacks any 
social identity since its relations with others are not part of it. The social identity that 
used to exist in pre-modern societies is not available to the self. Maclntyre views the 
modern self as lacking any criterion on which to judge its actions. He says the pre-
modern self had ends on which it could adjudicate its behaviour, but the modern self does 
not have those ends anymore. It lacks any ties and it is not formed and conditioned by 
anything hence his reference to it as the emotivist unencumbered self. It forms itself as it 
sees fit and it distances itself from anything if it so pleases. 
2.6 Identity of the self and community 
An individual's identity is established through her belonging. This belonging refers to 
communal groups that one may claim membership to. Maclntyre sees this membership as 
no accident but a fundamental necessity for one's being. An individual draws her identity 
from the groups that she belongs to. Without those groups the particular identity that she 
claims to have is not possible. 
In many pre-modern, traditional societies it is through his or her 
membership of a variety of social groups that the individual identifies 
himself or herself and is identified by others. I am brother, cousin and 
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grandson, member of this household, that village, this tribe 
(Maclntyre, 1981:32). 
These characteristics of belonging to a certain community or family are not accidental 
occurrences that need to be got rid of to discover who the real person is. Instead these 
characteristics are part of the substance that defines who the person is. Who the person is, 
is defined by the obligations and duties that she has. And those duties and obligations are 
ultimately derived from the person's membership in a community or family. 
An individual is born into a particular setting. In that setting she has particular 
relationships and from those relationships she develops her identity. If that space is 
absent then the individual is not a member of that particular setting. She becomes an 
outcast, one who does not belong. From those spaces the self s ends are given and the self 
has to move towards attaining those ends. 
This position is also shared by Charles Taylor. He sees the definition of the self as lying 
in answering questions that relate to one's relations with others and the space she 
occupies in her society or community. 
My self definition is understood as an answer to the question Who I 
am. And this question finds its original sense in the interchange of 
speakers. I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the 
family tree, in social space, in the geography of social statuses and 
functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I love, and so 
crucially in the space of moral and spiritual orientation within which 
my most important defining relations are lived out (Taylor, 1989:35). 
Maclntyre attacks what he calls the modern self. He sees this self as having no 
attachment to its social boundaries. It is a self that exists on its own terms and has no 
relationship with its surroundings. Its community does not form it and it has no inherent 
bonds with that community either. He sees this self as existing in what are called western 
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modern democracies. Since Rawls had developed his theory of justice to apply to modern 
democracies, Maclntyre's attack can be seen to be directed against Rawls's conception of 
the person in that democracy. 
These objections by both Sandel and Maclntyre are a response to Rawls's theory of 
justice. They both claim that Rawls commits himself to a certain metaphysical identity of 
the self. They both agree that the self Rawls is committed to, is not identified with its 
ends and it is not communal in nature. In the next chapter I look at these objections in 




To paraphrase Aune, metaphysics is the study of the nature of being, or reality. It is 
divided into general and special metaphysics. General metaphysics deals with all nature 
of reality, whereas special metaphysics deals with one kind of being, for example, the 
metaphysics of morals, personal identity and the possibility of survival after death 
(1986:11). 
My interpretation of 'the nature of being' is rather strict. I will take it to mean the 
essential elements that constitute a substance. The nature of something is what makes a 
thing what it is. Without that nature, that thing cannot be what it is. That nature tells us 
what a given substance is. 
The two communitarians I am looking at claim that John Rawls's theory of justice 
presupposes a certain metaphysical view of the self. In this chapter I will argue that 
Rawls's theory does not commit him to the metaphysical view of the self that these 
communitarians envisage. In doing this one of my contentions will be that these 
communitarians are not really engaging with metaphysics. 
Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre believe that the objections they raise against 
Rawls essentially pertain to the metaphysics of the self. A plausible interpretation of 'the 
nature of being' is seeing a substance in terms of what, in essence, constitutes it. When 
Maclntyre and Sandel claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of 
the self, it can only mean that they are saying something fundamental about what the self 
is. To get an idea of the approach to the self from a metaphysical point of view I will start 
by looking at the work of Derek Parfit. I suggest that the work of Parfit is a credible 
example of the nature of a discussion on the metaphysics of the self. I am not going to 
enter into the core debates of whether his arguments succeed or not, that is beyond the 
scope of my work. After considering Parfit I turn my attention to the communitarian 
objection to investigate how close it is to the Parfitian model. My view is that it is quite 
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far from proper metaphysics as exemplified by Parfit. For that reason I argue that the 
communitarian objection lacks force if taken as a strict metaphysical objection to Rawls. 
I suggest that the objection needs to be restated if it is going to have any effect on 
Rawls's theory of justice. 
3.2 Parfit and Personal Identity 
Derek Parfit suggests that we start with a thought experiment. In this thought experiment 
I am destroyed in a teletransporter but information regarding the state of each of my cells 
is recorded and transferred to Mars. A replica created from new matter wakes up on Mars 
and he seems to have all the memories I had when I was on Earth. That replica also has a 
body that looks like mine. Parfit claims that people who have given their time to think 
about these issues have come to very different conclusions. Some have concluded that if 
this were to happen to me then that would mark the end of me; the person who wakes on 
Mars is not the same as me. Others have argued that the person on Mars would be me. 
They just see the teletransporter as the fastest way of travelling. Parfit says this difference 
is a difference about personal identity, but further he presses that to understand this 
difference we must distinguish between two kinds of sameness (Parfit, 1995:13). He 
notes that we can have two white billiard balls that are exactly similar, or qualitatively 
similar, but they cannot be numerically identical. These two balls are not one and the 
same ball. He argues that if one of these balls was to be painted with another colour, it 
would cease to be qualitatively the same; but it would still be one and the same ball. He 
also gives an example that is found in common usage of language. We can speak of a 
person after an accident as being not the same person. 
That involves both senses of identity. It means that she, one and 
the same person, is not, now the same person. That is not a 
contradiction. The claim is only that this person's character has 
changed. This numerically identical person is now qualitatively 
different (Parfit, 1995:14). 
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Parfit acknowledges that some change has taken place, and rightly describes what change 
has occurred and what has remained the same. The character may have been altered, 
because of severe shock to the brain, but the person remains numerically the same. He 
notes that when psychologists talk about identity their concern is about the kind of person 
that someone wants to be. These questions and answers may be expressed in terms of an 
identity crisis. He points out that when philosophers discuss identity they are concerned 
with numerical identity, and that concern is about our future. The questions to be asked 
ultimately are around the notion of whether I will be the same person. 
I may believe that, after my marriage, I shall be a different person. 
But that does not make marriage death. However much I change, 
I shall still be alive if there will be someone living who will be me. 
Similarly if I was Teletransported, my replica on Mars would be 
qualitatively identical to me; but on the sceptic's view, he wouldn't 
be me. / shall have ceased to exist. And that, we assume is what matters 
(Parfit, 1995:14). 
Parfit's sentiment, in the above paragraph, convinces me that his direction of argument is 
the right standard to use in any metaphysical discussion of the self. The most crucial 
question is around whether I still exist or I have ceased to exist. This discussion will seek 
to answer questions on when can we say someone has ceased to be as we knew her, or 
has ceased to be altogether. It makes a distinction between questions on the changes of a 
person's character (or personality) and a person's existence. This distinction is crucial. 
Later I will suggest, against the communitarian view, that a person's character can be 
altered without impinging on the existence of the person. 
Parfit goes on to say that in order to understand questions on numerical identity, there is 
need to understand different criteria that have been used in determining the relationship 
between a person at one time and a person at another time which makes these one and the 
same person. For some it means having the same body, hence the replica on mars would 
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not be me, since bodily continuity would have been interrupted. For others to remain the 
same is an issue that involves some form of psychological continuity. 
In order to find out what makes one person the same over time and what changes she can 
survive Parfit considers a thought experiment in which he would undergo a certain 
operation. In that operation his body and brains are partially replaced. He is interested in 
finding out if the person who results from such an operation would still be him or that 
would mark the end of his existence. He does not think that there is a determinate answer 
to this inquiry. A determinate answer to such a question can only be true if we view the 
matter from the point of immaterial substances such as a Cartesian ego or a soul. He 
argues that there can be indeterminacy against the claims of Cartesians. Parfit rejects the 
reductionist view that states that a person's existence simply consists of the existence of a 
body that has a series of thoughts, experiences and mental as well as physical events. He 
claims that this position fails to make a distinction between persons and their bodies. In 
its place he argues for constitutive reductionism which makes a distinction between a 
person's body and a person. His view of the person is that it is an entity that has a body 
and thoughts and other experiences. A person is not just a body. "Although persons are 
distinct from their bodies, and from any series of mental events, they are not independent 
or separately existing entities" (Parftt, 1995:18). He states that if Cartesian egos really 
existed, they would be independent of bodies since it is claimed that their existence is like 
that of bodies. 
Thought experiments are helpful in making clear contentious issues on identity over time. 
For example, if an operation was carried out on me of which half of my brain and half of 
my body would be replaced, will I still remain the same person? Intuitively these 
questions call for a determinate answer but the crucial issue is finding that determining 
borderline. If, through a gradual process, 30% of my body was replaced and 70% of my 
brains were replaced, will I still be the same person? The issue being brought to the fore 
in this discussion is essentially a question about survival. We ask these questions because 
we are worried about our survival in the future. We are worried about what will become 
of us and whether we will survive this ordeal. Parfit is of the opinion that there is no 
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borderline that can be found that will determine when a person ceases to be as a result of 
the imaginary operation. 
Intuitively there is great moral importance to identity. Parfit best captures this importance 
when he says; "... several moral principles, such as those of desert or distributive justice, 
presuppose claims about identity. The separateness of persons, or the non-identity of 
different people has been called 'the basic fact for morals'" (Parfit, 1995: 28). Other 
issues that are related to this question can also be shown by various imaginary cases. Let 
us imagine that I committed some heinous crime in the past, and I go through the said 
operation, would it be just/fair to punish me? Am I still the same person who is getting 
punished? The same applies where the criterion of mental continuity is concerned. If 
there is no strong connection, mentally, between now and the time I committed the 
crimes-is it fair, let alone reasonable to punish me now? 
Parfit's own view on identity is that strict survival (i.e. identity) is not always what is 
important. He comes up with a thought experiment that is designed to show that survival, 
in some cases, does not matter. Parfit imagines that he has a twin brother. Unfortunately, 
Parfit's twin brother is brain dead and also quite unfortunately, Parfit's spine is broken. 
Let us imagine that an operation is carried out where Parfit's head and his brother's head 
are both removed from their respective bodies. Parfit's head is then fixed onto his 
brother's body. The question becomes; is this still Derek Parfit? Parfit notes that on the 
bodily criterion, clearly, he is dead and others may simply claim that these questions are 
not determinate. Parfit argues that this question is not important at all. He says the person 
(who undergoes the operation) will continue to have his memories and be psychologically 
continuous with him. He claims that it would be a good move for him to accept the 
operation. What the operation has done in this case is to heal his paralysis. 
Parfit's own words may serve well to illustrate his point; ... 
we should review our view about identity over time. What matters isn't 
that there will be someone alive who will be me. It is rather that there 
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will be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous 
with me as I am now, and/or who has enough of my brain. When there 
will be only one such person, he can be described as me. When there 
will be two such people, we cannot claim that each will be me. But 
that is as trivial as the fact that, if I had two identical siblings, they 
could not be called my twins (Parfit, 1995:44). 
It is not my intention to discuss the merits or problems in Parfit's theory of personal 
identity. I will not consider objections to it or other theories that compete with it. Unlike 
Andrew Brennan I will not develop any concept of the person based on the Parfitian 
model. He did his best to develop "a concept of the person along Parfit's lines. It turned 
out that the enterprise was only moderately successful" (Brennan, 1988:326). My brief 
summary of Parfit simply serves to illustrate the nature and form that a discussion on a 
metaphysical consideration of the self would take. This discussion is about how a single 
entity remains the same over time. It is a discussion about what kind of transformation an 
entity needs to go through before it ceases to be the same entity. It is important to note at 
this stage that the nature of the self is important to moral questions. The self is an entity 
for whom morality matters and its nature applies to moral questions. However, the nature 
of the self is not a moral question per se. 
A possible objection at this point could be that to restrict a discussion on the metaphysics 
of the self to such a narrow concept like relationship over time is unfair. It is possible that 
an objection can be raised along the lines that to limit metaphysics of the self to identity 
excludes other important aspects of human life. 
This objection does not go very far. What this objection fails to appreciate is that, as I 
outlined above, we have special metaphysics and general metaphysics. With special 
metaphysics, in this instance, we want to achieve an understanding of the nature of the 
being of the self. This has nothing directly to do with the way in which that self can come 
to value itself, or make judgements about the worth of its life. What we simply want to 
establish is whether this particular sort of being exists, or not, and under what conditions 
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it continues to exist. For that, Parfit and other philosophers who are worried about these 
questions and this nature of thinking could be called proper authorities to refer to when 
discussing strict metaphysics of identity. 
It is not as if Parfit's account is an isolated one. It is a view that is widely shared. 
Bernard Williams writes: 
I start more strictly with metaphysical questions. Identity intimately 
involves counting, either synchronic or over time, and problems of 
identity are connected with what, in ancient terms, may be called 
questions of the One and Many, of how many things of a certain sort there 
are at a certain place or over a certain period (Williams, 1995:2). 
Williams encapsulates the view that I am defending. This is the widespread view that is 
understood as the standard form in discussing questions identity of the self. 
Williams also considers what the implications are, in as far as identity is concerned, for 
species that split like the amoeba. If any moral implications can be drawn from counting 
one to the many that is a separate issue but there has to be counting in the metaphysics of 
identity. 
Williams says, following the discussions on the ship of Theseus, the question of who or 
what am I, brings in questions of social identity. 
Questions at this level about persons are, in a metaphysical sense, 
questions (sic) what or who a person is. Such questions can themselves 
be related to ethics and politics in a number of ways. They can bear, 
for instance, on the ethics and politics of euthanasia. But there is another 
kind of ethical and political question that can be expressed by asking the 
question 'what am I?' This kind of question concerns one's identity as 
a person who belongs to a certain family, group or race; they are 
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questions of social identity (Williams, 1995:7). 
Williams says identity, here, relates to a type or general thing. This identity is a type 
thing because it is something that is shared. For Williams to insist on that identity is to 
insist on how it is shared. He says it can also be seen as a social construct that is a result 
of social processes. For him that social identity is a "benign social stereotype". 
Williams does not end here, he further pushes his point: 
But what is it for a general character or role or type to constitute 
my identity? Here the relations between type and particular individual 
are crucial. It is very important that an identity of this kind is not 
my identity in the particular sense. If it were, then if I were separated 
from the life and allegiances which expressed that identity I would 
cease to exist. Moreover, if the form of life that embodied that 
identity were destroyed, the people who possessed it would cease 
to exist. But it is not so, and to insist that it is not so is not merely 
a piece of pedantry or an affirmation of abstract metaphysics. 
The point is included, rather, in the thoughts of the people who 
have such identities themselves. If those disasters happen, the 
particular people will still exist, because it is they who will have 
been damaged or wronged by this happening (Williams, 1995:8). 
Williams argues that a loss of culture is just a loss of possibility, and a loss of social 
identity is a loss of certain social attachments. What he is saying here is that these ties do 
not constitute what our personal identity really is. We can use his distinction to gain a 
better understanding of the roles that social ties may play in making the self become 
oriented in certain ways (or become a moral self) as opposed to metaphysical identity of 
the self. It is possible that these identities may be gained and lost in groups and Williams 
says these are questions that can be of interest to social psychology in attempting to find 
answers to the relations that members have in groups. He says using group membership 
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"goes rather wide as a definition of what might be called more strictly an identity" 
(Williams, 1995:9). Further he states, "a person who found his or her identity 
fundamentally in the membership of one of these organisations might be thought to be in 
a bad way" (ibid). 
I now turn to look at the communitarian objection and how it fares in the face of strict 
metaphysics of identity. 
3.3 Sandel: metaphysical objection 
In the previous chapter I outlined in detail both Sandel and Maclntyre's metaphysical 
objections to Rawls's theory of the person. Here I will briefly summarise Sandel's central 
objection to Rawls. He sees Rawls's conception of the self as based on what is most 
worthy of respect in our treatment of human beings. This is a moral position which 
presupposes a certain constitution of the self which Rawls does not acknowledge in 
explicit terms. This presupposition is a foundational account of the person. He calls it 
metaphysical. This account is about the essential nature of human subjectivity. In essence 
it deals with how people are formed. Sandel says Rawls is committed to a certain nature 
of the human subject and its identity. He says Rawls's "views are most evident in the way 
he pictures the relation between the self and its ends" (Mulhall and Swift, 1996:45). 
Sandel says Rawls's assignment of moral priority to the individual's capacity to choose, 
is both matched and explained by his assignment of a metaphysical priority. Mulhall and 
Swift summarise this position thus: 
Sandel claims that, for Rawls, the essential unity or identity of the self 
is also something given prior to the ends that it chooses; and it is the 
absoluteness of this metaphysical priority that accounts for the absoluteness 
of the moral priority (1996:46). 
His claim is based on Rawls's view that the self is prior to the ends that it chooses to 
pursue. For Sandel, this means that whatever the self s choice is, it can never be 
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constitutive of it. The self s identity is not informed by its own ends. No matter how 
conditioned it is by its choices, the self is always prior to its ends. Sandel says Rawls's 
insistence on the importance of the individual's ability to choose (above everything) is 
metaphysically a fundamental feature of the individual's personhood. 
From this Sandel says there are a number of problems with Rawls's theory, but I will 
only look at the three that are relevant to our concerns. The first problem is that Rawls's 
conception of the self gives the self an unusual relationship to its ends. These ends 
become things that the self can choose to be distanced from or attached to. This way of 
relating to one's ends is not right since there is a fundamental way of relating to one's 
ends which calls for reflection. This way of relating to one's ends can be called 
conditions of self-knowledge as opposed to Rawls's conditions of choice. 
Secondly the person's choice will never be an integral part of her. We can only talk about 
what the self is seeking, not what the self is. Sandel rejects the idea that a self can change 
her ends without losing who she is in the process. He also claims that such a conception 
excludes being torn between choices. This excludes any goods that are community 
directed as well as goods that are held in common with others. This position excludes any 
understanding of the self in relation to its ends. There are cases whereby people are 
disrupted because of a loss of their cherished goals or a loss of what they had embarked 
on as a lifetime project. 
Thirdly he says Rawls's understanding of the political community is an impoverished 
understanding. On Rawls's account the possibility of pursuing communitarian goals is 
excluded. Those communitarian goals are just possible ends that individuals may pursue 
but they do not constitute the identity of those individuals. Communal goals can only be 
pursued in as far as they are just some goods to be chosen among many others. Sandel 
accuses Rawls of ruling out any relationship between the self and her ends that is not 
"voluntaristic" (Mulhall and Swift, 1996:52). 
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"In short, whether the bond is political or non-political, Rawls's theory of justice seems 
to offer little scope for those who understand their relationships with others as 
constitutive of their identity as persons" (Mulhall and Swift, 1996:52) 
It is now important to look at whether the claim made by Sandel, that Rawls is committed 
to a certain metaphysical (and objectionable) conception of the self is accurate. Sandel 
says that Rawls is committed to a metaphysical understanding of the self that is prior to 
its ends and one that is not constituted by those ends as well as communally shared ends. 
He claims that if an individual were to lose these ends she would experience destruction. 
With what I have said above in relation to the form of what a metaphysical discussion 
might take, it appears as if Sandel has misplaced his criticism. 
Parfit and Williams have set out the agenda that has to be followed if we are going to 
discuss what makes a person one and the same over time. There are criteria that can be 
used to determine whether a person has remained the same over time. These criteria 
ultimately discuss the metaphysics of what it means to be a person. It can be expanded, if 
need be, but its expansion should not stray into other issues that concern the self. It 
appears to me that Sandel has strayed from what it essentially means to be a self. He has 
brought into the strict metaphysical discussion of the nature of self an issue that is more 
concerned with the kind of self one is. While it might be valuable to ask questions about 
how the self relates to its goods, or how the self relates to its community, these questions 
have no force in metaphysics that strictly discusses the identity of the self, without 
independent argument to establish that. 
Sandel may claim that his objection is cogent as a metaphysical objection because a self 
cannot be understood outside the parameter of what it holds to be its ends. He has clearly 
drawn a relationship between a person's end and that person's identity. He says that a 
person's end is who she is. In other words my identity is my set of ends. This is a 
distorted way of interpreting the self as an independently identified and named entity. It 
is a fact that selves ought to have ends and in that sense they are moral beings. But it is 
totally unclear that a particular self is marked by particular ends. If it ceased to have any 
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ends, then the self would go out of existence. But it is unclear why the self should die if 
its ends changed. The truth of the matter is that the self can be independently identified of 
any given ends. The self can have ends but the ends it has must not as a matter of 
necessity count as constituting its identity. 
Sandel's talk is really turning around issues of social identity and what it means for a self 
to be a member of a particular community. His argument can only have force if it is an 
argument that is meant to demonstrate that there is something inescapable about our 
communities giving us pointers to ends that we ought to pursue. His argument is, strictly 
speaking, an argument that can only show that a socialised individual, who has been 
raised in a particular setting, defies communal sense if she tries to escape the goods/ends 
of her community. But to say that is quite different from questions about personal identity 
or existence as an entity. 
Sandel has departed from our understanding of metaphysical identity. The questions that 
are to be asked if we are strictly talking about identity are questions that relate to the 
puzzle of the ship of Theseus that had its planks gradually removed because of decay. At 
the end the ship had a completely different set of planks. The question then becomes, is 
that still the same ship of Theseus? 
Following this line of thinking, it is fair to note that there is no counting whatsoever 
involved in Sandel's argument. Parfit does involve counting. Parfit says if each half of 
my brain was given to two people, the worry that who or where will I be, makes no sense. 
Whether we choose to agree with this view or not, at least he knows that proper 
metaphysics of identity has to involve counting somewhere in its discourse. The same 
view is shared by Williams as I indicated earlier. Williams argues that identity involves 
counting, either synchronically or over time. He says the central questions of identity are 
of one and the many at a certain place over a certain period of time. Or as with the ship of 
Theseus, how much of me can be removed, yet I remain the same. But on Sandel's 
account it is clear that he must say that one entity goes out of existence and another 
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comes in when ends change. This is not only implausible but goes very much against our 
intuitions on how a self ceases to exist. 
Williams makes an articulate distinction between social identity and metaphysical 
identity of the self. He shows the difference between social identity and personal identity. 
I believe that the point that has been made and that cannot be easily reversed is 
essentially about how social identities, which Sandel advocates for, are not really 
metaphysical identities of the self. The objection then to Rawls goes wide as a 
metaphysical objection. 
Sandel now owes us an explanation as to what he means exactly when he says people 
lose themselves when they are no longer oriented towards their goal. What is the 
relevance of that loss in the metaphysics of identity? That loss may be treated seriously in 
psychological therapy but it is not a loss of the person. Strictly speaking the self is still 
there. Its conditions of persistence remain unaltered. Its nature of being remains 
unaltered. To lose one's goal or end can be hardly thought to be a loss of the self. To 
claim that one has lost herself as an identifiable entity as a result of losing her bearings or 
her orientation is rather hard to believe. Although it can be true that our ends give us a 
meaning of who we are, it is patently false to claim that they give us a metaphysical 
definition of who or what we are. 
This question is serious and I will push it a bit further. Let us say for years my belief in 
some form of deity has been the most important thing in my life. Let us grant that I have 
always derived who I am from this belief in my deity. I have always strived to obey all 
his commands and perform all that he asks his servants to do. Whenever I failed to do 
what pleased him I felt immensely bad and felt as if I had failed not only him but also 
myself. I always hurried to amend my failures. But let us say one fine morning I wake up 
a new person. When I say "new" I mean I wake up with no belief in this deity. I am no 
longer oriented to those things that I used to think were such a fundamental part of me, or 
even essentially me. Add more to that, I also lose the bonds I had always shared with my 
fellow worshippers. I cut all interaction with them and I no longer share any communal 
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bonds or ends with my erstwhile community. It seems worthwhile to ask, what would 
have become of me? Sandel will say I would have ceased to exist. The self will have been 
disrupted. It is not clear what this statement means. What does it mean to say that the self 
will have ceased to exist? Does this mean that I would have become literally dead or I 
would have become a moral vegetable of some sort? To answer in the affirmative to both 
these questions, which Sandel will do, is a sign of a failure to understand what the 
persistence conditions of a self are. It is a failure in comprehending how a self comes into 
being and how it ceases to be. Losing interest in my ends and consequently replacing 
them is not my death. It simply is discarding old interests to make way for new ones or 
for no interests at all. Here although I could be charged with begging the question but the 
crucial point that emerges is to see how natural this description of the self and its 
conditions of survival sounds. 
Chisholm claims that an "...individual thing or substance may come into being; it may be 
altered in various ways and it may pass away; but it cannot become another individual 
thing or substance" (1989:85). The point made here is that a certain entity will remain as 
such an entity until it passes away. The changes it goes through cannot transform it into a 
totally new entity. Sandel may claim that a self who has lost all her ends has gone out of 
existence or has passed away but that is not how we understand a self to go out of 
existence. A person does not go out of existence simply because she has stopped pursuing 
her ends. She goes out of existence because she has ceased to exist, not because she has 
altered herself. If she were to go out of existence, the change she goes through must be 
enough to elicit agreement that a once existing entity has ceased to exist altogether. 
Sandel claims that there is a problem with the way that choice is privileged in Rawls's 
theory. For Sandel, the privilege that choice has makes Rawls committed to a 
metaphysical notion of an antecedently individuated self. He sees the prominence that 
choice is given as a bad thing, something that is done arbitrarily and without any deep 
reflection. Let us say the religion I had practised and all the tenets I had held to be true 
were actually false. Although it gave me purpose I have now, through thoroughly 
thinking about these issues, come to the conclusion that this religion and all its practises 
38 
are empty. On Sandel's account it seems I would be irresponsible if I change my religion 
and orientation on this realisation. I would be forced to stick to this religion because it is 
constitutive of my identity. I would not be allowed, for fear of ceasing to exist, to get rid 
of these ends, which I have now discovered to be bad, and not in good standing with 
truth. The fear will be that of losing myself. This is just bad logic and things do not 
happen this way. 
Lastly, even if Sandel was correct, which he is far from, his objection could be easily 
accommodated in Rawls's theory. Rawls's claim has been limited to the fundamental 
importance of the ability to exercise freedom. He sees this ability as something that is 
crucial to being a person within a social setting where one co-operates with others. That 
ability to choose is the greatest exercise of one of the inviolable conditions of being 
human. The moral worth and dignity of the individual resides in her capacity to exercise 
her ability to choose. 
To choose one thing over the other shows that there has been some deliberation before 
the actual choice is made. Whether that deliberation was between two conflicting ends or 
not is a trivial consideration. In fact there are no mechanisms in Rawls's theory that 
discourage any form of conflict between different ends. If the conflicts are there it is up 
to the individual which of the two or various conflicts she is more drawn to. Whether an 
individual reaches a choice through conflict or by tossing a coin is a matter that is best 
left to the individual. A theory that is designed to deal with conflicting interests between 
different members of society is surely capable of dealing with intra personal-conflict. It 
now seems right to say Sandel is the one who has to spell out more precisely what his 
identity objection really consists in. This objection can only make sense if taken strictly 
as applicable to how people choose, what ends people hold and what degree they should 
hold those ends. As it stands, it is not an identity objection. And even if it were to make 
sense on grounds of ends and communality, I am not sure to whom it would be directed. 
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3.4 Maclntyre: metaphysical objection 
Maclntyre accuses liberalism of a commitment to a view of the person that is incoherent 
and of being sceptical of the possibility of rationality and objectivity in moral matters. 
Like Sandel he holds that liberalism does not give due recognition to the importance of 
communal life in shaping the identity and integrity of the person (Mulhall and Swift, 
1997:72). He argues that contemporary liberal societies are faced with a serious problem. 
Individuals in these societies argue about their respective moral positions. An adversary 
of a certain moral position and a supporter of that position seem to have sound premises 
and valid conclusions for their arguments. However, they are unlikely to convince each 
other since there is no objective standard to appeal to in moral discourse. Each individual 
holds her position out of pure preference. Unlike in traditional societies were there were 
standards like virtue to appeal to, modern liberal societies have no standards of morality. 
This leaves members of these societies in perpetual disagreement because each prefers 
and justifies her own moral view. Maclntyre claims that this is emotivism, meaning that 
each individual appeals to her own feelings and attitudes. He thinks that modern 
individuals treat people as means to an end and see any of their ends as beyond any 
objective rational scrutiny. The self is unable to value any end as intrinsic to it. He says 
that every viewpoint can be subjected to criticism. 
For Maclntyre any moral position that the individual takes is arbitrary. Characteristics 
and attitudes do not make that individual's identity. The subject lacks a narrative, but to 
make sense of the subject we need to introduce telos in life, like the Aristotelian virtues. 
Human life can only be understood in terms of intentions and desires that the individual 
has. The best way to solve any moral dilemma is to ask a question about how to live a life 
well. That will be in essence giving a narrative to one's life. Maclntyre argues that the 
unencumbered self makes decisions on its own, without referring to any external 
communal standard. All its decisions are arbitrary since they do not take into account the 
social roles of the individual. 
Maclntyre argues that the possession of one's historical identity coincides with social 
identity. In his view, we inherit, socially, a tradition. An individual who questions and 
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rebels against that tradition is in effect acknowledging it. Debates are always occurring 
within the tradition and new spaces are always opening. Each tradition is not closed but 
retains a standard of measuring itself. 
Maclntyre is of the opinion that a failure to recognise that human beings are 
constitutively attached to their communities leads to the failure to give an account of 
circumstances that are necessary for the individual to achieve any kind of good. The idea 
of morality as rational does not succeed where communal ties are not seen as crucial to 
the individual. 
In brief Maclntyre's accusation is that liberals are committed to a view of the self that is 
incoherent and emotivist. The liberal self is unencumbered and all the moral decisions 
that the self is committed to are arbitrary. 
Maclntyre and Sandel's conceptions of the self are very similar. Maclntyre agrees with 
Sandel that the community is very important in defining who the self is. He sees the 
modern self as having been stripped of that crucial understanding of itself through its 
membership of a particular community. Modern liberalism has failed to give due 
importance and recognition of communal life in shaping the identity and integrity of the 
self. In as far as Maclntyre agrees with Sandel on the importance of community in 
defining the self, I believe I have sufficiently answered him on that score. Like Sandel, 
Maclntyre fails to touch on the central issue what makes one person the same over time. I 
will be addressing his charge that liberalism leads to an incoherence of the self since that 
self is not able to articulate a narrative of its life. 
Maclntyre argues that the modern individual is unable to give a narrative of its life 
because it seeks to be atomistic. In the behaviour of moderns actions are not properly 
situated against a background of their large scale intentions. Each act is a mere 
expression of preference. He argues that in order to understand what a person is doing at 
any given time we need to understand that person's long term intentions and goals. 
Events that happen in the lives of people do have a purpose. They just do not happen as a 
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series of unconnected actions. The individual who sees her life as a series of unconnected 
events cannot render it intelligible. An individual plays a certain role within a certain 
setting which provides him with his narrative. In seeking to give a narrative an individual 
seeks to establish what it means to live a life well. She is trying to find what the best way 
of living her life is. If she is asked to make a decision between two conflicting 
requirements her narrative helps her make the best choice. She does not ask herself which 
requirement is good for its own sake. Rather, she asks which requirement is good for me. 
The unity of the narrative must be coherent; this means that it should avoid some 
contradiction. An individual must give a story that shows consistency in the choices she 
makes. This is informed by her intentions every time she is called upon to adjudicate 
between two conflicting choices. She will make a choice that is consistent with her large 
scale intentions, a choice that does not undermine her obligations. For Maclntyre this is 
what constitutes the essence of the self. It is plausible to claim that there is a place for a 
narrative in the standard metaphysical debate that stresses continuity of certain aspects of 
a person's life. However the details of such a story are irrelevant to it being a story. 
Maclntyre is confusing these two issues. He has placed unnecessary importance on the 
details in the story. 
Maclntyre is of the opinion that if my community constitutes me, the likelihood of me 
departing from what my community expects and demands of me is very small. He 
stretches this argument to claim that those who rebel against their communities are 
actually acknowledging the ends/goods that their communities have afforded them. 
It is not clear to me what that "acknowledging" really consist in. I suspect that he means 
that the rebels are acknowledging the communal goods to be part of them. If this is the 
case then Maclntyre can claim there really can never be any genuine rebels. Our ordinary 
knowledge of rebels and revolutionaries is that they are people who have come to the 
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realisation that the status quo of their communities is inherently unacceptable. Those 
who rebel against social structures, religious teachings, moral dictates and laws, would 
have found their communities inadequate or unjust. This can hardly be viewed as any 
kind of acknowledgement, unless if it means that the rebels are acknowledging that their 
community is inherently decayed. I doubt if this is the kind of acknowledgement that 
Maclntyre has in mind. He can only mean that the rebels are rebelling rather in vain. No 
matter how much they rebel they will still come to feel some form of nostalgia and 
inescapability of their communal goods. This, unfortunately for Maclntyre, is not the case 
with true rebels who seek to bring a change in their communities. The history of 
humankind is filled with instances of heroic rebels who rose against their ingrained 
beliefs and viewed them with scorn and overthrew the status quo. 
Maclntyre's criticism of the modern liberal society can be applied to Rawls's original 
position. In particular the veil of ignorance can be viewed as problematic since it 
represents people as free of attachment with an ability to distance themselves from 
everything that should condition them. Each individual can do what she prefers as long as 
she does not discriminate against anyone or interfere with anyone's interests. Hence 
Maclntyre's criticism of the modern society and the modern self as unencumbered 
emotivist self. The modern self is indifferent to her social setting and the historical 
context of that setting. She is indifferent to her particular circumstances and the 
interactions she has with fellow members of her community do not make who she is. This 
criticism of the self in the original position is a result of a misapprehension of the 
purposes of that position. 
Will Kymlicka argues that the original position has been mistaken to be representing a 
certain metaphysical commitment of the self. He says the veil of ignorance is really an 
intuitive test of fairness. In removing bias and sources of privileging oneself Rawls 
wanted to come up with a position that was acceptable to everyone in conditions of 
fairness. The parties' primary concern is accessing primary goods that would ensure that 
1 Genuine political rebels come to the realisation that their systems should be overthrown. That realisation 
is not acknowledgement in the affirmative. If it is an acknowledgement, it can only be an acknowledgement 
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they live a worthwhile life without regard to their particular position (Kymlicka, 1990:62-
64). 
This is a cogent objection against communitarians in general. But I believe it applies 
extremely aptly against Maclntyre. It is not precisely clear how Maclntyre reaches his 
conclusion that the ends of individuals under the liberal scheme are arbitrary. It does not 
necessarily follow, as a rule of logic, that an individual who is behind the veil of 
ignorance will become a champion of arbitrariness. It does not follow that these 
individuals will not have any commitments to their families or feel strongly bound to 
their communities. What follows is quite simple, and Maclntyre distorts it. What follows 
is that each of these individuals will have the right to choose what they want to pursue in 
as far as that choice does not interfere with the rights of fellow citizens. These individuals 
also have the freedom, which is naturally endowed in them by virtue of their nature, to 
revise everything including the value of being free to choose. That ability to choose 
which is central to the nature of being a person does not even slightly imply that there is 
going to be arbitrariness in the manner in which choices will be made. It does not even 
imply that individuals will view their communities with suspicion. It means that 
individuals' beliefs are taken equally and all will be committed to the same process. It is 
wrong on the part of Maclntyre to read arbitrariness into freedom. Arbitrariness and the 
responsible exercise of freedom are two things that have no relationship whatsoever. To 
be an agent that has capacity to make responsible choices, and further revise those 
choices cannot be equated with indifference or arbitrariness. 
Arbitrariness commands neither admiration nor respect, at best it is something that 
responsible people will avoid. A person who can exercise her freedom can hardly ever be 
thought to be arbitrary by definition. The frequency in which freedom is exercised cannot 
be properly thought to be evidence of arbitrariness. What that exercise shows is that the 
agent who regularly makes changes to her life is simply exercising her freedom which is 
guaranteed in the social relations pronounced by the veil of ignorance. A debate on 
whether it is right or not to constantly revise and change one's choice is not a matter that 
of the negation of the community's shared beliefs. 
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can be easily settled. Maclntyre may suggest that he has an answer to this and argue that 
those who are always choosing anew have no fixed bonds or are not properly constituted. 
There is no reason why that argument cannot be countered by the claim that choice in 
itself is boundedness of equal weight. 
To develop a proper understanding of the veil of ignorance, we must look at the 
motivations behind it. The motivation is primarily to rule out unfair bias which leads to 
favouring certain positions over others and also to guarantee the civil liberties of all 
citizens. 
The self has the right to exercise her capacity to make choices. If the individual feels 
dissatisfied with certain bonds they have created in the past, she is free to desert these 
bonds in search of new ones that will make her feel more satisfied. If we are to follow the 
account that we are given by Maclntyre, pursuing new parameters of association becomes 
arbitrariness. This is simply not true. No person can be called arbitrary if they feel 
suffocated or limited by their associations and they choose to broaden their horizons. 
Maclntyre claims that the problem with liberalism ultimately lies in its inability to 
provide a standardised framework where different choices will be judged and those, 
which are not worthwhile, will be discriminated against. What is worthwhile and what is 
not worthwhile is an issue that will always be strongly contested among participants in 
various social structures. I do not refer to issues like comparing the life of a rocker and 
drug addict to the life of a God fearing woman who carries out deeds of charity. I have in 
mind certain situations where two individuals pursue lives that are generally admirable 
but have different motivations. Even more controversial is the issue of religious belief. 
Though an upright Jew is just as admirable as an upright Christian, they will never 
subject themselves to any standards that will favour one faith over the other. Their 
actions could be motivated by their beliefs, they could even be similar virtuous acts 
which command admiration, but each will see the other's faith as unworthy. This is a fact 
about people's beliefs. What is worthy is always a moot point 
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The standard of arbitration that Maclntyre provides is suspect. He says we should strive 
for something akin to Aristotelian virtues. We should lead virtuous lives striving for 
eudaimonia. But why should we do that? What privileges the Aristotelian virtues over 
other schemes and programmes that answer questions that worry about how to lead a 
worthwhile life. What is the extra quality in eudaimonia that marks it as superior to the 
Ten Commandments, utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, Buddhism and a host of other 
philosophies of what a good life is? We do not know how Maclntyre's arbitration can 
ever be fair in deciding which life will be worthwhile and which one will not be. In this 
situation, Maclntyre feeling the need to devise a plan that will be deemed fair will be 
forced to create a system that seeks everyone's consent to its righteousness. Such a 
system will not only be arbitrary, in line with the whims of those who formulate it, but it 
will also be, in all likelihood, totalitarian. 
Maclntyre is committed to these virtues because he believes that from the fact that the 
self has certain fact it should have certain ends. He argues that when we think of a builder 
we tend to think of her as executing certain functions. The same applies with the self. 
When we think of the self, its facts tell us something about its moral behaviour. Certain 
facts of the self, like its capability to be a moral agent, tell us that it ought to be a moral 
agent. I will save consideration of this claim for the next chapter. 
Justice as fairness does not encounter the pitfalls that Maclntyre has run into. Justice as 
fairness leaves every individual to choose what she deems worthy of pursuit. The only 
constraint that is imposed on the individual is that she should not interfere with the good 
of others. There is no need that we devise a system that will set standards to discriminate 
one good from another. Certain goods can never yield to that comparison. And in essence 
this is what the theory of justice and veil of ignorance are about. Rawls did not intend to 
discuss personal identity. He wanted to limit his investigation to what is fair and 
acceptable in the distribution of goods and what privileges each citizen would enjoy in a 
society. 
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Further Maclntyre's system is prone to discourage individual freedom and creativity. 
Everyone will be asked to stay in line, whatever that line would be. Those who show 
genius and difference2 and question the system will be deemed not worthwhile and 
punished accordingly. 
Maclntyre's claim that traditions have mechanisms in them that are always open to 
debate is difficult to believe. Any system that is entrenched in traditional belief does not 
tolerate being questioned. These systems are slow to open up to debate and they depend 
on what has always been done. Traditional systems, be they religious, political or social, 
resent questions that seek to change certain facets. In religion those who hold beliefs that 
are not mainstream are labelled heretics. In society those who hold views which are not 
popular are labelled anti-community. All these terms are meant to discourage people 
from actively questioning and opening new frontiers. Traditional organisations follow 
rules rigidly and they are interested in creating a uniform identity. One that submerges 
individuality to the common good. Even when that common good has become the 
common bad, traditional societies will always insist that the common bad be seen as the 
common good. 
Both Sandel and Maclntyre need to focus their objection where it can be pertinent. It 
would be better if they focus their objection on whether the theory of justice is a good 
theory of governance. They should criticise its claims on how citizens may come with 
principles that are fair or just. They are at liberty to question whether there can ever be 
such principles even in the veil of ignorance. Their objections would have had force had 
they been directed at whether the theory of justice secures each individual's needs and 
rights as Rawls had envisaged 
2 This has always been the case with totalitarian states like Stalinist Russia. Writers and thinkers are forced 
to go underground because they are not conforming to the communal good. In liberal society individuals 
pursue a number of activities including criticising the status quo without fear of being labelled anti-
community and consequently persecuted. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 Rawls's denial of any metaphysical commitment 
In this chapter, 1 will outline John Rawls's own response to the communitarian critique. 
After outlining his position I will compare and contrast it with my response. From this, it 
will emerge that the response I have offered to the communitarian critique is preferable to 
Rawls's own response. 
Rawls says that what he failed to emphasise in his book, A Theory of Justice, is what 
justice as fairness is intended as. He says that justice as fairness is intended as a political 
conception of justice. Although justice as fairness is a moral conception, he argues that it 
is a moral conception that has been developed for very specific purposes and ends. He 
argues that justice as fairness, as a moral conception, is worked out for a specific subject. 
And the subject that Rawls has in mind refers to the political, social and economic 
institutions that make society. He refers to it as the basic structure of modern democracy 
(Rawls, 1999:389). Rawls denies any concern with the metaphysical nature of the 
individual in this community. What he is concerned with is the nature of the institutions 
that make up modern democratic societies. His worry is mainly found on the basic 
liberties of individuals that make up the modern society. He is concerned with the 
distribution of primary goods as well as the political order of the society. 
According to Rawls, justice as fairness is the most practical way of organising societies 
which have individuals with competing ends; ends which are sometimes in conflict. 
Justice as fairness, he says, should not be interpreted as presupposing some interesting 
metaphysical account of the self. 
the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, 
and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents 
itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve 
as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens 
viewed as equal and free persons (Rawls, 1999:394). 
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Rawls denies that there is any metaphysical truth presupposed by his theory as to how 
society should be organised. He is not committed to any metaphysical view of how 
society is constituted. Rawls says by denying that commitment, his conception of society 
avoids great philosophical problems. Instead, it only tells us how modern democracies are 
organised. There is nothing to be read into his theory that would make it seem as giving 
certain metaphysical or epistemological truths about the nature of democratic societies. 
Rawls argues that all goods are secured in the agreement that is reached by individuals in 
democratic societies. He says in arriving at this agreement disputed philosophical, moral 
and religious claims are avoided. These disputed questions are avoided not because they 
are seen as unimportant, but because they are of a far greater importance; there is no way 
they could be resolved politically (Rawls, 1999:394). 
Essentially, this means that Rawls has limited his conception of justice as fairness to a 
purely political consideration. Moral and religious claims have their own importance and 
the disputes that come with them can be considered in other areas. Their solution and 
consideration does not reside in political solutions. Rawls's project is only limited to how 
a society should be organised. Although justice as fairness is indeed moral, its moral 
status should only be understood as an attempt to organise the political, economic and 
social institutions of modern societies. 
Rawls notes that in the original position, individuals are taken as free persons and he 
says this has led to some misunderstanding of what the term 'free persons' might mean. 
Communitarians have interpreted the term to mean that it represents a certain 
metaphysical account of the self. Rawls, then, seeks to explain what the freedom of the 
person really means in that context. He says there are three senses in which we can 
understand citizens to be free without necessarily committing ourselves to a metaphysical 
account of the self. 
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The first is that citizens are free in the sense that they see themselves and their fellow 
citizens as having the moral power to develop and have a certain conception of the good. 
This conception of the good is not static. Citizens are free to revise and modify their 
conception of the good. Since they are free persons, they have the right to view their 
persons as independent from, and not identified, by any conception of the good. 
Whatever end an individual might have does not constitute the identity of the person. If a 
person changes her goods she does not cease to be. Rawls argues that if a person changes 
her goods she does not cease to be the same person for the purposes of political justice. 
How she is treated as an entity is not altered and her expectations from social structures 
remain the same He draws a distinction between non-public, relational identity with 
public identity. He says although a person may change her conception of the good, she 
remains with the same duties and obligations (Rawls, 1999:404-405). 
Rawls says that in private a citizen might have goods that cannot be separated from her 
and she cannot think of herself without these goods. But over time these goods may 
change. Such a change can happen slowly or suddenly, and when it happens suddenly, 
the individual in question might say that she is no longer the same person. But Rawls 
says we know what this means. It only refers to a pervasive shift in character or final 
ends. He says the change refers to a non-public, religious or moral identity. "On the road 
to Damascus Saul of Tarsus becomes Paul the Apostle. There is no change in our public 
or political identity, nor in our personal identity as this concept is understood by some 
writers in the philosophy of mind" (Rawls, 1999:405-406). 
The second way in which citizens might be understood as free in Rawls's system is that 
they see themselves as self-originating sources of valid claims. They think their claims 
have weight apart from being derived from social obligations or duties. He says claims 
that arise from a citizen's conception of the good or moral doctrine will also count as 
self-originating. Duties and obligations are self-originating from a political point of view 
if the citizen's moral doctrine and conception of the good is compatible with the public 
sense of justice. These citizens are different from those whose values are derived from an 
aristocratic system or religious order (Rawls, 1999:406-407). This simply means that the 
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citizens are the original authors of their own claims or commitments. They have freely 
embraced them without coercion and can freely depart from them. These claims are not 
imposed on the citizens by a hierarchical structure. This point should be understood as 
simply restricted to the citizens' ability to exercise their power of choice. 
The third way is that citizens are regarded as capable of taking responsibility for their 
ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed. The central issue that is raised 
in this third point is about social cooperation and the ability of citizens to adjust their 
aims and aspirations in the light of what they can reasonably expect to provide for. 
Citizens understand that the realisation of their aspirations does not depend on the 
intensity of their desire. On the contrary citizens realise their aspirations on the grounds 
of the reality of the positions they occupy; from which they could have justified 
expectations. 
A crucial component in Rawls's theory is that there is a way in which individuals are 
supposed to relate in society. This relationship is essentially of cooperation and ensures 
that individuals relate in a way that is fair. But in coming with these conditions that 
ensure a fair relationship between individuals, the interests and the character of 
individuals themselves is not fixed or given. "A theory of justice must take into account 
how the aims and aspirations of people are formed; and doing this belongs to the wider 
framework of thought in the light of which a conception of justice is to be explained" 
(Rawls, 1993:269). 
Rawls recognises that social institutions determine to a great extent the kinds of persons 
individuals want to be and the kinds of persons they really are. Social institutions do 
shape people's aspirations and ambitions as they open up certain possibilities to them and 
denies them other possibilities by virtue of the positions those people occupy. These 
positions will in turn inform people what to expect in terms of opportunities. 
So an economic regime, say, is not only an institutional scheme for 
satisfying existing desires and aspirations but a way of fashioning 
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desires and aspirations in the future. More generally, the basic 
structure shapes the way the social system produces and reproduces 
over time a certain form of culture shared by persons with certain 
conceptions of their good (Rawls, 1993:269). 
Rawls says the realisation of natural talent is dependent on certain social conditions. 
These conditions have to do with how social institutions support and encourage 
individuals to realise their potential. A particular talent that exists at any given time will 
be affected by the prevailing social norms and the forms of the institutions in that society. 
"So not only are our final ends and hopes for ourselves but also our realised abilities and 
talents reflect, to a large degree, our personal history, opportunities and social position. 
There is no way of knowing what we might have been had these things been different" 
(Rawls, 1993:270). 
Rawls argues that what the theory of justice needs to regulate are the different chances 
affecting citizens that arise from the social starting position, natural advantages of 
individuals and certain historical accidents that can favour certain individuals. "Even if 
these inequalities are not in some cases very great, their effect may be great enough so 
that over time they have significant cumulative consequences" (Rawls, 1993:271). 
Rawls's primary argument is that ends are not given. He sees ends as coming from the 
way in which society is moulded over time. Citizens will be constrained to adopt certain 
ends by what is given to them by their societies. But that should not mean that those ends 
constitute who the individuals are going to be since they can always revise their ends. 
This is what Rawls has to say on the freedom of the person and her relationship to her 
society. 
Now freedom as applied to social institutions means a certain pattern 
of rights and liberties; and equal freedom means that certain basic 
liberties and opportunities are equal and that social and economic 
inequalities are regulated by principles suitably adjusted to preserve 
the fair value of these liberties. From the preceding definitions 
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of freedom as applied to moral persons and to social forms, it is 
plain that free and equal persons are not defined as those whose 
social relations answer to the very principles that would have 
been agreed to in the original position. For to say this would 
undermine the argument for these principles that is grounded 
on their being the principles that would be adopted 
(Rawls, 1993:280-281). 
4.2 The original position and social cooperation 
Rawls says that in order to understand why people in the original position would accept 
the first principle of justice as fairness which is the principle of basic liberties, we must 
understand that in justice as fairness the aim is to work out a conception of political and 
social justice which is consistent with our deep beliefs of modern day democracies. He 
introduces a conception of the person together with the conception of social cooperation. 
The aim is to come up with an agreement on how basic social institutions are to be 
arranged if they are going to conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as persons. 
This conception of the person is only regarded as a conception of political and social 
justice. It only directs how citizens are to think of themselves and others in their political 
and social relationships. "This conception is not to be mistaken for an ideal that for 
personal life (for example, an ideal of friendship) or as an ideal for members of some 
association, much less as a moral ideal such as the Stoic ideal of a wise man" (Rawls, 
1993:299-300). 
Rawls explains the notion of social cooperation not as merely organised and efficient 
social activity that is guided by some public rule. He says social cooperation is always for 
mutual advantage and it contains two elements. The first is that it involves consensus on 
fairness of cooperation that each participant accepts. There should also be reciprocity and 
mutuality in that the participants must be prepared to accept benefits and burdens in 
common and there should be a fair standard of judgement in that cooperation. He says his 
basic structure provides a framework in which individuals can cooperate for the 
satisfaction of all the essential purposes of life, which is served by different groups and 
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associations in society. Persons born into this society are supposed to have a capacity to 
be normal and fully cooperating members over a lifetime (Rawls, 1993:301). 
The fair terms of social cooperation for this case specify the 
content of a political and a social conception of justice. But if 
persons are viewed in this way, we are attributing to them two 
powers of moral personality. These two powers are the capacity 
for a sense of right and justice (the capacity to honor fair terms 
of cooperation and thus to be reasonable), and thus the capacity 
for a conception of the good (and thus to be rational). In greater 
detail, the capacity for a sense of justice is the capacity to understand, 
to apply, and normally to be moved by an effective desire to act from 
(and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice as the fair 
terms of social cooperation. The capacity for a conception of the 
good is the capacity to form, to revise and to rationally to pursue 
such a conception, that is, a conception of what we regard for us as a 
worthwhile human life. A conception of the good normally consists 
of a determinate scheme of final ends and aims, and of desires that 
certain persons and associations, as objects of attachments and loyalties 
should flourish. Also included in such a conception is a view of our relation 
to the world-religious, philosophical, or moral-by reference to which these 
ends and attachments are understood (Rawls, 1993:301-302). 
Rawls argues that these two moral powers are taken as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for an individual to be recognised as a full and equal member of society when 
we deal with questions of political justice. What is rendered is that Rawls's conception of 
the person is metaphysically neutral. It is not committed to any particular account of what 
constitutes the self. All accounts are likely to accept that this conception is indeed neutral, 
including communitarians as well. 
54 
4.3 How my response differs from Rawls's response 
A major difference between the response that Rawls has given to the communitarian 
critique and my response is the way we engage the criticism. The two communitarians I 
looked at in my previous chapter make it explicit that they are engaging Rawls on his 
metaphysical commitment to the view of the self. Maclntyre claims Rawls's conception 
of the self that he calls the "unencumbered emotivist self is incoherent. Sandel on the 
other hand claims that Rawls is committed to an antecedently individuated self who 
stands apart from her ends. Rawls does not explicitly engage any of these 
communitarians on their claims and his response is to suggest that they have 
misunderstood his intentions. He chooses to offer an explanation that expands his earlier 
arguments. This is worthwhile in as far as it clarifies certain points that could be unclear 
or hard to comprehend. But more could be done in dealing with the communitarian 
objection and showing how fallacious it is. This is what I seek to do. 
Rawls attempts to sidestep the question of metaphysics. As we have seen above, he says 
that the issues that relate to metaphysics are important but are best left out of a political 
theory. Part of his refusal to engage metaphysics is that it is a wide area that commands 
little agreement. He explicitly adopts what he calls an avoidance method. 
What I have sought to do is to engage the communitarians on what they say. I try to show 
that they have confused issues that are central to the metaphysics of identity with other 
issues. Rawls gestures in the direction of Parfit but does not engage the communitarians 
in arguments. My strategy has sought to present the form that a metaphysical discussion 
might take. This form, contrasted with the communitarian objection shows that there is 
something fundamentally wrong with both Sandel and Maclntyre's positions. 
I point out that the objection that the communitarians bring as metaphysical is couched in 
a language that is far from any straightforward understanding of the nature of 
metaphysics of the self. First both Sandel and Maclntyre depart from the mainstream 
understanding of the metaphysics of the self without offering any reason as to why we 
should depart from that common understanding. It is their duty to argue and spell out why 
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the common understanding is insufficient and why a new understanding should be 
developed. We have a traditional understanding of the terms that are used when we speak 
of identity through time. Geoffrey Madell says when we speak of identity we are 
speaking in terms of connections although these connections are different. 
Traditionally, accounts of the crucially important connection have 
tended to fall into one or other of two camps. Some philosophers 
have seen the essential connection to be that of relation to one and 
the same body. They have taken the identity of the human body 
through time as something which is in itself unproblematic, and 
have posited connection or relation to the body as that which unites 
what would otherwise be mysteriously separate, even ownerless, 
experiences (Madell, 1981:2). 
On the other hand there is an opposing school of thought that insists on the mind. They 
argue that a series of experiences through time should be of the same mind. 
The essence of personal identity through time for this school of thought 
is provided by the continuity of consciousness itself, of which by far 
the most important element, and for many thinkers the only crucial 
element is memory (Madell, 1981:3). 
Parfit says as a reductionist, in matters of personal identity, what matters is psychological 
connectedness. "Relation R is what matters. R is psychological connectedness and/or 
psychological continuity, with the right kind of cause" (Parfit, 1984:262). 
The language that is used in the discussion of personal identity will have to be restricted 
to considerations of either physical or psychological connections. Arguments must be 
restricted to whether those connections fully represent what the identity of the self is. A 
quote from Parfit will render my point more clear: 
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There is nothing more to personal identity than the holding of relation 
R. In nearly all of the actual cases, R takes a one-one form. It holds 
between one presently existing person and one future person. When 
R takes a one-one form, we can use the language of identity. We can 
claim that this future person will be this present person (Parfit, 1984:262). 
Anyone who objects or agrees with Parfit will have to use the same form of language and 
engage the concepts that are at work in that discussion. 
The communitarian objection does not only represent an objection to Rawls's position. It 
actually represents a new form of the metaphysics of the self. It is within Rawls's rights 
to state that he is not committed to any metaphysical view of the self but my direct 
response to their criticism is a far stronger one that is also available to the Rawlsian. 
In stating that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical conception of the self, the 
communitarians make it abundantly clear that there is something fundamentally wrong 
with that position. In faulting it they advocate a certain position on the metaphysics of the 
self. This position sees the individual as bounded by her goods. These goods define who 
she is and without these goods she ceases to be. Rawls rightly notes that we know what 
we mean when we say someone has changed. In this vein he agrees with Bernard 
Williams and with what I have said against the communitarians. But Rawls does not go 
beyond merely stating that we know what we mean when we say, I have ceased to be 
when my ends change. The communitarians can also agree with Rawls and claim that we 
know what we mean when we say by losing my ends I have ceased to be in a special 
sense. But my argument has endeavoured to show that since communitarians claim to be 
engaged in metaphysics, saying that I have ceased to be takes on a metaphysical status. It 
is acceptable for those who are not engaged in metaphysics to say I have ceased to be in a 
special sense, but once the communitarians are pushed in the direction of strict 
metaphysics to show that their claim is incoherent. 
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The incoherence of their claim arises from the fact that metaphysically speaking a self 
who loses herself ceases to exist altogether. That self has gone out of existence. When 
communitarians speak of losing oneself, they are really not talking about an entity 
ceasing to exist as an entity that has been considered under certain metaphysical 
conditions. All they can seriously mean is that the self as an entity has gone through some 
interesting transformation. It is here that I show that what Sandel and Maclntyre are 
engaged in is not strict metaphysics of the self as we understand it from the theory of 
personal identity. Unlike Rawls, my response does not need to explain in great detail 
what justice as fairness entails or the principles that are involved in arriving at its 
particular conception of the person as a political agent. 
Rawls avoids the sting of the communitarian objection. I contest the content of their 
objections on the ground on which they are made. Since they present their objection as 
metaphysics they invite one to confront it on that front. Only if it is deemed successful or 
if at least it stands up to the rigorous demands of some form of metaphysics, do we need 
to start explaining what Rawls's theory really means and what it is aimed at. The reason 
why I adopt this approach lies in my view that Rawls's scheme is clear. The objection 
that it invited from the communitarians was not a convincing objection since it blatantly 
misrepresented the project. An objection that misrepresents key issues under 
consideration does not merit a detailed explanation regarding what the aims of the project 
it misrepresents are. 
My emphasis lies in attacking the paradigm shift undertaken by communitarians in the 
discussion of the metaphysics of the self. Our understanding of the metaphysics of the 
self is that it involves discussions on what makes a person the same over time. This 
understanding has informed the ongoing philosophical debates on issues of identity. It 
has not been my interest to investigate the merits of all the sides that oppose each other 
on this debate. My emphasis has been to show that all parties concerned with this debate 
speak the same language. They are worried about two crucial issues. The first issue 
relates to an entity that persists over a period of time. The second issue relates to whether 
that entity remains the same or whether it goes through some fundamental transformation 
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such that a totally different entity comes to exist in its place. This can be called counting 
over time. Anyone who wants to get into the debate of the metaphysics of personal 
identity will have to speak the language that involves an entity remaining one and the 
same over a certain period of time. 
Sandel and Maclntyre do not use this language at all. Instead, they bring a totally 
different understanding on how a self should be understood from the metaphysical point 
of view. This introduction is not backed by argument that might show why that change is 
necessary or why the language and terminology we have always used in discussing 
personal identity has become obsolete. 
My argument is that they have brought a certain issue that is not best suited to 
metaphysics. Persons are entities that are indeed moral entities. By saying persons are 
moral entities I do not mean that their definition is strictly to be understood in terms of 
their moral convictions or the ends they hold. My claim is simply restricted to that 
persons are entities for whom moral convictions and specific ends matter. They are the 
things that morality is for. They derive their meaning and fulfilment from such 
convictions. But to derive fulfilment and meaning from a certain state of affairs is very 
different from being constituted by that state of affairs. I have argued that my ends are 
not what constitute me. Rawls on the other hand recognises the importance of morality 
and having the conception of the good. However, his position is that it is best to leave 
these considerations out when coming with a political programme that is aimed at 
securing the liberties of citizens and ensuring an acceptable distribution of communal 
goods. 
Rawls separates the good from the right, but that in itself is not the best possible way of 
dealing with the communitarian objection in the way that it is stated. My project is to 
question the conflation of value and identity that has been done by Sandel and Maclntyre 
in as far as they claim that the conflation is essential to the metaphysics of the self. My 
argument aims to show that Sandel and Maclntyre have created a misleading if not 
confused relationship between the self and its ends. Taking their objection as a 
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metaphysical objection, I have argued that there is no sufficient ground to create an 
inseparable relationship between the self and its ends. To say I am lost without my ends, 
or that I cease to be when my ends suddenly change is not the same as claiming that I 
have ceased to be, numerically, the same person as I was a few years ago. Sandel and 
Maclntyre must accept that if I lose my ends in a dramatic and sudden fashion then I have 
ceased to exist in the sense that I would not be the same person in all senses of the 
meaning of the phrase no longer the same person. They should concede that numerically 
I would have become a different entity, morally I would be a different entity and I should 
be treated in a different manner from the treatment I would have otherwise received had I 
not lost my ends a few moments ago. 
4.4 Preference of responses. 
My response is preferable to that of Rawls because of the pressure that it puts on 
communitarians in general. Communitarians have created an unjustifiable connection 
between the metaphysics of personal identity and the values that the self holds. This link 
is one that is not backed by argument as to why it should be adopted as a yardstick of 
personal identity. 
Not only do communitarians fail to give a proper account of the metaphysics of the self 
but they also commit themselves to a highly suspicious account of the self. 
David Hume argued that there is no justification in deriving ought from is. What he 
meant by this is that there is never sufficient reason to reach moral conclusions from facts 
alone. Hume separated facts from moral sentiments that are expressed as a response to 
those facts. He argued that moral obligations couldn't be created by simply referring to a 
certain state of affairs that is factual. 
Maclntyre explicitly argues for such a view. The fact about persons is that they are 
entities for whom certain moral positions matter. They are entities for which certain ends 
are intricately interwoven into their understanding of themselves as the type of people 
they are and what makes their lives worthwhile. If a person loses her ends she might go 
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through certain feelings or processes. Ends and moral positions define what a person 
pursues, what she holds in high regard and what she generally abhors. This is a fact about 
normal and properly functioning persons. 
But what are we to derive from this basic fact? Maclntyre seems to have derived an ought 
from this fact. His ought is that since persons are entities for whom morality and ends 
matter, those ends should be communally sanctioned and communally shared. If one 
loses or undermines her communal bonds then she ceases to be. For all communitarians, 
then, a person is an entity for whom ends and morality matter, and ought to share her 
values with her community, ought not to lose them otherwise she will cease to be. 
This as I have shown is wrong. Although the self must have ends and interests for itself it 
is not those ends. Losing those ends does not mean much more than merely losing them. 
Communitarians want us to believe that the ends of a self are essentially it, because a self 
is an entity that has ends, therefore it ought to have ends that are communally oriented. 
The inefficacy of the communitarian position and its erroneous view on the metaphysics 
of the self proceeds from this mistaken view of the relationship between ends and the 
self. By getting this understanding wrong, the communitarians are now committed to 
some incoherent positions as outlined above. What they call a metaphysical objection 
fails to be a metaphysical objection. It becomes a discussion on morals and which morals 
are more important than others. This is not what strict metaphysics is about. 
Metaphysics is concerned about the nature of being. The nature of being in as far as 
personal identity is concerned does not turn on morals. It is simply a matter of relation 
between an entity that remains the same and a certain period of time. What is crucial to 
arriving at any plausible conclusions is to establish whether that entity has gone through 
sufficient changes to warrant it to be viewed as a new entity. 
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Communitarians give us a distorted suggestion of what constitutes the self and that 
constitution lacks force in strict metaphysics and it leads them to unacceptable 
conclusions. 
4.5 Further research 
The debate provides very interesting insight into the nature of persons. There are certain 
crucial mistakes that communitarians have committed in attempting to show that Rawls is 
committed to a self that is not encumbered by its social setting and its ends. I have tried 
to show that their objection to Rawls's self shows them to be committed to a certain view 
of the self. It is the communitarian view of the self that I have sought to prove as an 
erroneous metaphysical understanding of the identity of the self. 
The communitarians in attempting to conflate questions of identity and questions of 
morality have committed themselves to a position that sees individuals as instruments 
that must have certain ends. They suggest that individuals should be understood in terms 
of their commitments and social bonds. While it is true that persons are evaluated on 
what they hold as their ends or what they value; serious questions arise if this is treated as 
the essence of personal identity. 
My position has not denied that social bonds play an important role for a self. I have 
simply questioned if these bonds should be taken as a crucial identity to the person. From 
this debate we can proceed in an interesting direction. 
Following Williams's distinction between benign social stereotypes as forms of identity 
and metaphysical identity of the self which involves synchronic counting or counting 
over time we can come to various identities of the self. Further research and debate 
should be directed towards whether being a self consists in a one to one relationship or it 
involves a certain exercise of morals and temperament. 
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A further interesting question will be to investigate whether it is possible for benign 
social stereotypes can fall together with strict metaphysical identity of the self or whether 
these two can be pulled apart. 
If they fall together it would be interesting to find out if it is possible to develop a new 
understanding of the self. It would be worthwhile to find out if what I have defended as 
the definition of the metaphysics of the identity of the self can accommodate what 
communitarians advocate in the definition of the self. If this is possible would the nature 
of the self change? Would it be justifiable to derive an ought from is as communitarians 
suggest? 
But if, on the other hand, it can be shown that benign social stereotypes and metaphysical 
identity cannot be brought together, what, then, is the role of ends. I have not denied that 
ends are important, but at the same time I have not suggested their proper role. An 
interesting question would be to find the role of ends without necessarily confusing it 
with our identity. 
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